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Legitimate governmental interests include measures necessary to the security and effective maintenance of a facility, see id. Rutherford, supra, not to its continued operation in an overcrowded state. Manson, supra, "[t]he only conceivable purpose overcrowding This basically economic motive cannot lawfully excuse the imposition on the presumptively innocent [pretrial detainees] of genuine privations and hardship over any substantial period of time Accord Morales-Feliciano v.

Parole Bd. Hernandez Colon v. Morales-Feliciano, S. Indeed, we rejected a similar argument in Michaud v. There, the sheriff claimed that the conditions in the jail had a "penological justification[:] We note, moreover, that increasing the budget is not the only means to guarantee compliance with the Constitution.

Overcrowding, for instance, may be eliminated by prudent changes in bail Cauthron, supra at Accordingly, we conclude that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, and we agree with the trial judge that the plaintiffs' due process rights were violated.

Propriety of remedial order. The plaintiffs appeal the judge's denial of their motion to amend judgment pending appeal. The sheriff asks that we vacate or raise the population cap, but he also appears to agree with the plaintiffs that some further remedial action is necessary. In his reply brief, the sheriff, while continuing to argue that conditions at the jail are not unconstitutional, stated that he "is committed to a long-range continuing effort to deal effectively with the overcrowding situation, and would welcome the institution of special criminal trial sessions and additional resources to solve this overcrowding emergency.

As far as the propriety of the remedial measures already ordered is concerned, we conclude that the judge was well within his powers in ordering a population limit or "cap" at the jail. See Perez v. Boston Hous. Many courts have held that population caps are particularly appropriate remedial measures in jail overcrowding cases. Inmates v. Lanzaro, F.

Idaho imposing population caps ; Libby v. Marshall, F. Malcolm, F. The rest of the judge's order also is appropriate and is narrowly tailored to his findings. See DiMarzo v. We also agree with the plaintiffs, however, that further remedial measures may be necessary.

The judge evidently was reluctant to order further remedies because of uncertainty concerning the extent of his powers, and it is clear that he could not, by himself, order special sessions. We note that he did order that the sheriff was to "[w]ork with the courts If necessary, the assistance of the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court should be sought. We will not order such special sessions without further consideration by the trial judge because he is in a better position than an appellate court to determine whether such sessions are appropriate at this time.

See Battle v. Anderson, F. Joinder of additional parties. Before trial, the sheriff filed a motion to compel joinder of additional defendants, including the Commissioner of Correction and the county commissioners of Middlesex County. See Mass. The plaintiffs assented to the motion, but the judge denied it.

The sheriff contends that the judge erred in refusing to join these additional defendants. Rule 19 a provides for joinder of a party if "in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties The plaintiffs have not sought relief through expansion or renovation of the jail, nor did the trial judge grant any relief implicating the duties of the county commissioners.

There was no error in refusing to join the county commissioners. The sheriff also argues that the Commissioner of Correction is a necessary party, because under the terms of the current remedial order, the sheriff is ordered to "[t]ransfer all inmates who may be transferred under the provision of M.

Indeed, the Commissioner "has statutory responsibility over precisely the conditions giving rise to the violations. We will not permit unconstitutional conditions to be perpetuated "out of an overly-nice solicitude for the division of powers and duties between county and state officials.

Eisenstadt, F. We conclude, therefore, that for purposes of administering the current order and any further remedies that the trial judge shall order on remand, the Commissioner of Correction should be joined. See Stock v. Massachusetts Hosp. School, Mass. The sheriff does not operate in a vacuum, and he has demonstrated that the Commissioner is in a position to thwart his compliance with the judge's order.

See note 13, supra. Cahill, supra ruling that the Commissioner of Correction was a proper party defendant in an action concerning unconstitutional conditions at a county facility. See also Benjamin v. Libby v. On remand to the trial judge, we order that the Commissioner of Correction be joined as a party defendant. The trial judge's judgment concerning liability of the sheriff is affirmed, as is the judge's order. The case is remanded for consideration of such further remedies as now are needed.

The Commissioner of Correction is to be joined as a party defendant. Each cubicle shall have a bed, desk, chair, and storage space for personal belongings. In the dayroom and indoor exercise areas, there shall be wash basins available on a ratio of one wash basin for every eight 8 inmates or fraction thereof.

Because the judge's conclusion that the detainees' due process rights were violated is adequate to support the relief ordered, we need not address these conclusions. Because this purported waiver occurred after entry of judgment, it is not properly before us, as plaintiffs' counsel observed during oral argument. The waiver does not, of course, excuse the sheriff from compliance with the judge's order.

Manson, supra, the court considered relevant the length of time during which inmates are exposed to conditions. The sheriff points to a statistic not in the record indicating that the average length of stay is sixteen days. We do not consider this information, because it is not properly before us, although we note that an average length of stay is often a misleading statistic where there is a high turnover of "shorttimers" among detainees.

If sixteen days is the average, many inmates may be incarcerated for longer periods. See id. We also note that Mass. This time period is extended if a defendant requests a continuance. Certainly one year is a significant period of time in which to be exposed to genuine privation or hardship. Thanks to Officer Athridge's keen instinct and attention to detail, he prevented a serious situation from occurring.

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We're hiring! Wishing a happy th birthday to the USNavy. Thank you to all those serving today and to those who have served, especially members of the Middlesex Sheriff's Office who proudly wore the uniform both at home and abroad. Alert The information on this website is taken from records made available by state and local law enforcement departments, courts, city and town halls, and other public and private sources.

From time to time thereafter, on an average of about six weeks after sentencing, a moratorium inmate has been transferred to a State correctional facility where, for the first time, the inmate was delivered to the reception center for the purpose of classification.

The moratorium was designed as a cooperative effort between the commissioner and the Superior Court to alleviate severely overcrowded conditions in State facilities. On March 20, , Billerica, whose inmate population has been increasing recently, had inmates.

It is agreed, indeed it seems axiomatic, that inmate population levels in excess of the capacity of correctional institutions increase the risks of danger to the public, to the inmates, and to the correctional staff.

The department has found Billerica not to be in compliance with certain of the department's requirements concerning space. The State Department of Public Health has claimed that Billerica fails to comply with its requirements concerning the minimum square footage necessary for each inmate. The plaintiffs argue that a Superior Court judge lacks the authority to order that a prisoner, sentenced to a State correctional facility, be delivered to the sheriff to be held at Billerica.

They contend that the Legislature has established a scheme for the sentencing of persons convicted of crimes and for the execution of those sentences under the executive branch of government.

They point to G. Any direct placement of a prisoner in Billerica, they argue, is contrary to this statutory mandate. The plaintiffs further point to the provisions of G. Although the plaintiffs make no particular note of it in their brief, G.

The implication of Section 23 is that sentences of more than two and one-half years are to be to State facilities, and that, pursuant to G. The commissioner argues that the authority of a judge in the Superior Court to commit a State prisoner to a county correctional facility is not limited by any statutory provision.

He argues that the two-and-one-half year limitation of G. State prison sentence directly to a county facility. It seems clear, however, that the commissioner cannot circumvent the limitation on his power to place a State prisoner in a county facility by enlisting the aid of the Superior Court.

The moratorium might be regarded as such an attempt. However, if the commissioner cannot place a State prisoner in a county house of correction without the sheriff's consent, there remains the question of the authority of a Superior Court judge, quite apart from any cooperation with the commissioner, to sentence a State prisoner to serve at least the initial portion of his State prison sentence in a county facility.

We see in the statutory pattern an intent that defendants sentenced to State correctional facilities not serve any portion of their sentences in county facilities, without the consent of the appropriate sheriff.